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Abstract
This paper provides new estimates of the effects of increased federal and state minimum
wages on the employment-based health insurance coverage of low-wage workers.  I use March
Current Population Surveys collected from IPUMS, for 1988 to 2005. Previous studies have
found no significant evidence that increased minimum wages reduce fringe benefit receipt
(Beeson Royalty 2000; Simon and Kaestner 2003). In contrast to these studies, I use a
difference-in-difference approach and I define treatment groups as being individuals in the
lowest 1 and 2 deciles of the hourly wage distribution. 
Little evidence was found for the federal minimum wage increase of 1990-91, but
estimates of the effect of the 1996-97 increase suggest a small negative impact for younger
workers and workers in smaller firms. At the state level, I find more suggestive results of a
negative impact of the minimum wage increases. New Jersey (1992) and Massachusetts
(2000-2001) exhibit negative effects of being in the treatment group on the probability of having
employment-based health insurance for most of the specifications, while the results in Oregon
(1991) and Connecticut (2000-2001) are more sensitive to the specification. The results suggest
that being in the treatment group makes individuals 3 to 4 percentage points less likely to be
policyholders of employment-based health insurance compared to the control group. 
JEL Classification Codes: J32, J33
Keywords:  Minimum Wage, Fringe Benefits2 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Health insurance has become an increasingly important topic for researchers, especially 
since millions of Americans do not have health insurance coverage.  Despite the attention given 
to the lack of employer-provided health insurance and the falling standard of living for those in 
the lower part of the income distribution, the gap in coverage between those in the upper part of 
the income distribution and those in the lower part has actually diminished in the recent years.  
However, the gap in coverage remains large.  In 2005, for example, nearly 77 percent of those in 
the upper wage deciles were covered compared with only 23 percent of those in the lowest wage 
decile.  The narrowing of the coverage gap is due to a combination of both reduced coverage in 
the upper wage deciles and increased coverage in the lowest wage decile.  
The widening income gap between those at the top and those at the bottom that has 
occurred over the past 25 years was one of the motivations for the recently passed increase in the 
federal minimum wage.  The most frequently cited negative impact of increased minimum wages 
typically is their presumably negative impact  on employment, particularly  on those  who are 
newest to the labor force and with the lowest levels of skills.  Studies of these impacts are 
decidedly mixed (Card and Krueger 1994; Neumark and Wascher 1998).   
One  possible  explanation  for  the  failure  to  find  consistently  significant  effects  of 
minimum wages on employment is that employers are able to adjust on other margins.  For 
example, Wessels (1980) argued that employers would reduce fringe benefits and provide less 
pleasant working conditions. Beeson Royalty (2000) and Simon and Kaestner (2003) find no 
significant effects of the minimum wages on fringe benefits for low-skilled workers, both at the 
state and federal level.
1 
                                                 
1 There are two main streams of literature regarding minimum wage laws: one that studies the implications of 
increases in minimum wages on employment, and another one that explores the relationship between minimum 3 
 
This paper provides new estimates of the effects of increased federal and state minimum 
wages on the employment-based health insurance coverage of low-wage workers.  Using CPS 
data from 1988 to 2005 and a difference-in-difference approach, I examine the effects of several 
increases in the state and federal minimum wage on the coverage rates for policyholders of 
employer provided health insurance for individuals in the lowest 1 and 2 deciles of the hourly 
wage distribution. Little evidence was found for the federal minimum wage increase of 1990-91, 
but estimates of the effect of the 1996-97 increase suggest a small negative impact for younger 
workers and workers in small firms.   
At the state level, I find more suggestive results of a negative impact of the minimum 
wage increases. New Jersey (1992) and Massachusetts (2000-2001) exhibit negative effects of 
being in the treatment group on the probability of having employment-based health insurance for 
most of the specifications, while the results in Oregon (1991) and Connecticut (2000-2001) are 
more sensitive to the specification. The results suggest that being in the treatment group makes 
individuals 3 to 4 percentage points less likely to be policyholders of employment-based health 
insurance compared to the control group. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section Two briefly reviews the previous literature; 
Section Three presents the theoretical background; Section Four includes the data and variables 
description; Section Five presents the empirical strategy, Section Six shows the main results and 




                                                                                                                                                             
wage and the fringe benefits. Among studies related to employment, some of them find negative effect of minimum 
wages on employment, while other studies find ambiguous or positive effects.  
 4 
 
2.  Related Studies 
 
2.1. Studies Examining the Minimum Wage Effects on Employment 
The difference-in-difference approach I use in my empirical strategy has been used by a 
number of studies on the employment effects of the increases in the minimum wages.  It is the 
results of such studies, particularly those of Card and Krueger (1994; 1998) that have caused 
many  economists  to  doubt  whether  minimum  wage  laws  in  the  U.S.  have  had  a  significant 
negative impact on employment.   
In his recent review of the literature, Brown (1999) noted that as of the early 1980s, there 
was  reasonably  broad  agreement  among  economists  regarding  the  employment  effects  of 
minimum  wages.    Much  of  this  agreement  was  based  on  time-series  studies  whose  sample 
periods  included  the  late  1970s.    Most  studies  found  significantly  negative  impacts  of  the 
minimum wages on teenagers, group known to have lower levels of formal education and labor 
market experience. In an earlier review of the literature, Brown et. al. (1982) concluded that the 
most likely impact of a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage probably reduced teenage 
employment by between 1 and 3 percent. Yet, Brown (1999) notes that the 1980s may not be a 
very promising time period during which to identify the employment effects of minimum wages 
because the federal minimum wage was fixed in nominal terms between 1981 and 1990, and the 
only variation in the real value of the federal minimum wage arose solely from increases in the 
overall price level.  The more recent time series evidence led researchers to other approaches that 
make greater use of cross-sectional data (Brown 1999, p. 2121).  
Probably the first study that could be characterized as using the difference-in-difference 
approach to estimate the impact of minimum wages is that of Egge et. al. (1970). This study 
compared the low-wage and high-wage workers, using individuals paid more than the old level, 5 
 
but less than the new level of the 1967 minimum wage as the treatment group. Egge et. al. 
concluded that there is little evidence of negative effect on employment. While defining the 
treatment group in a similar way to Egge, Currie and Fallick (1996) found an adverse effect of 
the  1980  and  1981  increases  in  minimum  wage  on  employment.  However,  Brown  (1999) 
acknowledges that the 1981 recession may have been “harder on low-wage workers than others”, 
hence the negative effects found by Currie and Fallick (p. 2141), and that “low-wage workers 
faring well in expansion and poorly in recessions is a tempting conjecture in the absence of 
obvious alternatives” (p. 2142). 
There are more studies that use a difference in difference approach to examine the effects 
of increases in minimum wages on the low-wage industry employment. Katz and Kruger (1992) 
examine the effects of 1991 federal minimum wage increase on fast-food restaurants in Texas, 
and Card and Kruger (1994) examine the 1992 increase in minimum wage in New Jersey. Both 
papers find no evidence that the fast food restaurants surveyed reduced employment. Card and 
Krueger (1994) compare low-wage restaurants in New Jersey to those in Pennsylvania, and low-
wage  and  high-wage  restaurants  in  New  Jersey.  In  response  to  Card  and  Krueger  (1994), 
Neumark and Wascher (1998) collected their own data from fast food restaurants in New Jersey 
and Pennsylvania, and found opposite effects of the minimum wages. When using BLS data, 
Neumark and Wascher find that employment in eating and drinking establishments (not just fast-
food restaurants) increased more slowly in New Jersey than in Pennsylvania. Card and Krueger, 
on the other hand, find that employment in fast-food chains grew insignificantly faster in New 
Jersey. In his analysis of the literature, Brown (1999) concludes that “it is very hard to reject the 
hypothesis of no effect” (p. 2138) in both the Texas and the New Jersey examination of the 
minimum wages.  6 
 
2.2. Studies Examining Fringe Benefits and the Minimum Wage  
Besides  studying  the  effects  on  employment,  Katz  and  Kruger  (1992)  and  Card  and 
Kruger (1994) also verify if there are non-wage offsets of the increases in the minimum wage. 
Both studies find no significant changes in the likelihood of receiving fringe benefits after the 
change in minimum wage took place.  
Wessels (1980), Beeson Royalty (2000),  and Simon and Kaestner (2003) explore the 
minimum wages effects on fringe benefits more extensively. Wessels (1980) presents theoretical 
models and empirical evidence for the effects of minimum wages on wages, employment, fringe 
benefits and working conditions. He shows that employers are likely to reduce fringe benefits 
and not to improve working conditions in order to offset part of the increase in wages due to 
mandated minimum wage laws. Beeson Royalty (2000) examines the effects of the minimum 
wage  increases  on  the  probability  that  low-skilled  workers  are  eligible  for  pension  benefits, 
health  insurance  benefits,  and  paid  sick  leave.  The  study  finds  a  significant  reduction  in 
eligibility for pension benefits associated with increases in minimum wage, and less significant 
results for the effect of the minimum wage increase on health insurance and paid sick leave 
eligibility. Simon and Kaestner (2003) use data from National Longitudinal Survey of Youth and 
the  Current  Population  Survey  and  examine  the  effects  of  state  and  federal  changes  in  the 
minimum wages on  groups likely to be affected by minimum wages. Their results show no 
significant effects of the minimum wage on fringe benefits for low-skilled workers, at both the 
state and the federal level.  
Most recently, Acemoglu and Pischke (2001) examine the effects of the state and federal 
increases in minimum wages between 1987 and 1992 on the on-the-job training of low wage 
workers. Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), the authors find 7 
 
no evidence that minimum wages reduce training, and little evidence that they tend to increase 
training. Same conclusion is also reached by Brown (1999).  
 
3.  Theoretical Background  
 
Fringe benefits represent a significant proportion of the total compensation offered by the 
employers to their employees in return for labor. The theory of optimal fringe benefits puts 
together  the  firm’s  isoprofit  curve  and  the  workers’  preferences,  represented  by  indifference 
curves. An indifference curve shows the various combinations of wages and fringe benefits that 
meet  a  constant  level  of  utility  for  the  worker.  An  isoprofit  curve  shows  the  possible 
combinations of wages and fringe benefits that provide a given level of profit for the firm. The 
indifference curve that is tangent to the isoprofit curve gives the optimal combination of wages 
and  fringe  benefits  for  both  the  worker  and  the  firm.  In  the  figure  below,  the  optimal 
combination is 
* * ( , ) W F . 
 






Now let’s consider the effect of introducing a minimum wage 
* W W ≥ that is binding for 
all the workers in a firm. The effect on equilibrium wages and fringes depends critically on the 
product market conditions.  For my purposes, it is sufficient to assume that all output is sold at 
world-determined competitive prices, in which case the firm has no choice but to produce at the 
same cost, meaning that fringes must be reduced dollar-for-dollar with wages.  This situation is 
depicted in Figure 1. A binding minimum wage forces the firm to move to the left of the original 
combination of wages and fringes, 
* * ( , ) W F , offering workers a higher wage and a lower level 
of fringe benefits. Workers, of course, are worse off, their new indifference curve (I1) passes 
through the budget constraint where W W = , and lies below the initial indifference curve (I0). 
Things are more complicated when we add workers with higher wages, not constrained 
by  the  minimum  wage.  Due  to  nondiscrimination  rules,  when  firms  employ  both  types  of 
workers, they must offer the same level of fringe benefits to all workers. Carrington, McCue and 
Pierce (2002) show that nondiscrimination rules for firms with different types of workers limit 
within-firm inequality in preferential tax treatment benefits, but they place no corresponding 
constraint on within-firm inequality in wages. The authors assume that there are two types of 
workers  in  the  labor  market:  blue-collar  and  white-collar.    Workers  have  Cobb-Douglas 
preferences over wages (W) and fringe benefits (F):  
1 ( ,  )  U W F W F
α α − = .  
There are three sectors in the economy: (a) a blue-collar sector with completely elastic 
demand for blue-collar labor, (b) a white-collar sector with completely elastic demand for white-
collar labor, and (c) a mixed sector where blue-collar and white-collar workers are employed in 9 
 
equal proportions.
2  In what follows, I shall use lower-case subscripts to denote the type t of 
worker and upper-case superscripts to denote the sector S:   
B = blue collar,  
W = white collar,  
and      M = mixed.    
Thus, if the utility level of type-t workers in sector S is equal to 
S
t U , then cost minimization by 
firms leads workers of type t to earn wages equal to 
1 [ /(1   )]  
S S
t t W U
α α α
− = − and fringe benefits 
   [ /(1   )]
S S
t t F U
α α α
− = − .     
Carrington  et.  al.  assumed  that  blue  and  white-collar  workers  are  used  in  fixed 
proportions of one-to-one.  I modify this assumption only slightly by assuming that a unit mass 
of workers is employed, where a proportion p is white-collar and a proportion 1-p is blue-collar.  
The firm therefore minimizes 
( ) 1
M M
w pW p W F + − +  
To see how the firm solves its problem, note that the firm could offer all workers the same level 
of fringe benefits as exists in equilibrium in the blue-collar sector, 
M B M
b F F F = ￿ , but in order 
to  attract  white-collar  workers,  would  have  to  raise  the  white-collar  wage  to  
( ) ( )
1/ 1 a M W B
W w b W U F
α −
= ￿  
In  the  limit,  if  the  firm  employs  a  large  number  of  blue-collar  workers  this  would  be, 
approximately, the cost-minimizing wage rate for the white-collar workers.  If, however, the firm 
employs a large number of white-collar workers, then it may want to offer a higher level of 
fringe benefits to its workers, thereby offering blue-collar workers a wage-fringes package with a 
                                                 
2 Labor demand is given by a monotonically negative function G (Wb + Ww + Fb + Fw ), G’(-) < 0. 10 
 
higher level of utility than that available in the blue-collar sector.
3  When allowing for fringes to 
be higher in the mixed sector than in the blue-collar sector, the solutions to the minimization 




















−   =  
 
 
The higher the share of the white-collar workers, the lower the increase in their wages, 
and the higher the level of fringe benefits is. This implies that a firm using a high share of white-
collar workers will keep the level of fringes offered to all workers at a relatively high level, and 
it will not be forced to increase the white-collar workers’ wages too much. For a given minimum 
wage, the lower the share of white-collar workers, the lower the level of fringe benefits, and 
therefore, the higher the decrease in fringe benefits in the mixed sector is.  
The fringe benefits fall for all workers in the blue-collar sector and in the mixed sector, 
but the magnitude of the effects depends on the level of the minimum wage. The change in the 
fringe benefits for blue-collar sector equals the increase in wages, in absolute value, and it is 
given by the formula:  
1 B B
b b F W U W
α
α
−   ∆ = −∆ = −  
 
 
The change in the fringe benefits for blue-collar workers in the mixed sector is expressed in 
terms of utilities for both blue-collar and white-collar workers, and is given by the formula:  
                                                 
3 If costs rise above the world price for the mixed firms, they will disappear, leaving only blue-collar and white-
collar firms. If, however, the mixed firms can pass some of the increase in costs onto consumers, then some, but not 
all mixed firms will survive. There are a number of ways to get around this counterfactual, including introducing a 
downward-sloping demand curve for the output produced in each sector. Extending the model to this case would 
introduce considerable algebraic complexity and shed comparatively little additional light on the question at hand.  I 
therefore leave this exercise for future research.  One can view the exercise worked out here as being relevant for the 
short run in which resources are not mobile across sectors.   11 
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and  ( ) ( )
1/ 1/
(1 ) b w k p U p U
α α
= − +  
When comparing the changes in fringe benefits between the blue-collar and the mixed sector, the 
expression becomes more complex:
  
( ) ( )
1
1/ 1/ 1 1 1 1
( )
B M B
b b w b w
p p
F F U p U U U W
k k
α α
α α α α α α
α α
−
−   − − −       ∆ − ∆ = − − − −        
         
 
Whether this expression is positive or negative depends on the original utility levels for blue-
collar  and  white-collar  workers,  on  their  share  in  the  mixed  sector,  and  on  the  level  of  the 
minimum wage.
 
If  ( ) ( )
1
1/ 1/ 1 1 1 1
( )
B
b w b w
p p
U p U U U W
k k
α α
α α α α α α
α α
−
−   − − −       − − −        
         
￿ ,  
then the decrease in fringe benefits is higher in the blue-collar sector than in the mixed sector.  
 
However, if  ( ) ( )
1
1/ 1/ 1 1 1 1
( )
B
b w b w
p p
U p U U U W
k k
α α
α α α α α α
α α
−
−   − − −       − − −        
         
￿ ,  
then the decrease in fringe benefits is higher in the mixed sector than in the blue-collar sector.  
Brown (1999) noted that “as long as the minimum wage is set low enough that it affects 
only a small share of employment, the effect of the minimum wage on total employment is likely 
to be small and in any case swamped by other factors. Thus, it makes sense to focus on the 12 
 
analysis  of  low-wage  groups,  where  the  proportion  directly  affected  is  larger  and  so  the 
anticipated effect on group employment is likely to be larger”.  
Although it is hard to clearly separate blue-collar workers from white-collar workers in 
the real world, I do associate low-skilled individuals with the blue-collar workers, and the rest of 
the population with the white-collar workers. As a measure of low skills I use the bottom 10% 
and  bottom  20%  wage  earners,  and  I  examine  whether  there  are  any  differences  in  their 
probability of being a policyholder of employment-based health insurance compared to the other 
workers after a binding minimum wage is imposed.  
 
4.  Data and Variable Description 
 
For my research purpose I use March Current Population Survey (CPS) data extracted 
from the IPUMS-CPS database. CPS is a monthly survey of about 50,000 households conducted 
by the Bureau of the Census for the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The survey is the primary source 
of information on the labor force characteristics of the U.S. civilian non-institutional population, 
as well as basic demographic files of household, family, and individuals, such as age, sex, race, 
marital status, educational attainment, annual income, work related variables. The sample period 
in this paper is 1987 to 2004.  Individuals in armed forces are excluded from my analysis, as well 
as  those  younger  than  18  and  older  than  64  years.  Descriptive  statistics  are  presented  in 
Appendix A, Table A.1. The total number of observations is 1,259,587 at the federal level, 2,769 
observations in Oregon, 9,101 in New Jersey, 4,642 in Connecticut, and 6,365 in Massachusetts, 
but the actual sample size varies depending on the specification.
4 
                                                 
4 The case studies analyzed at the federal level are the 1990-91 minimum wage change, the 1996-97 minimum wage 
change, and one that combines these two changes. In choosing the case studies at the state level, I select the states 
with increases in minimum wages at a higher level than the federal minimum wage, and than the neighboring states. 13 
 
  Hourly wage is defined as the total wage income in the previous year divided by the 
product of usual hours worked per week and usual number of weeks worked last year. In order to 
get reliable estimates for my analysis, I set as missing all observations with allocated values for 
total wage income, usual hours worked per week and number of weeks worked, as well as for 
other variables used. Wages are indexed using 2005 CPI to make data comparable over time. I 
also restrict the sample to workers who earn an hourly wage equal at least to 50% of the federal 
minimum wage and less than $337.50, which represents the lower limit for the 90
th percentile of 
the 99
th percentile of hourly wage. I define deciles and quintiles of hourly wages, by year, to 
break the coverage rates into these groups. The wage deciles and wage quintiles are used to 
define the treatment and control groups in my empirical analysis.   
The health insurance variable used in this study is the policyholder of employment-based 
health insurance. In constructing the variable, I start from individuals who have private coverage, 
and then I exclude those who privately purchased health insurance coverage and those who did 
not have health insurance in their own name. I set as missing all the observations with allocated 
values for the variables used and for the unemployed population.  
The average coverage rates for the employer-provided health insurance are 57 percentage 
points at the federal level and 60.1 percentage points in Oregon, 61.9 percentage points in New 
Jersey, 59.9 in Connecticut, and 57.1 percentage points in Massachusetts, respectively. Average 
real hourly wage is $18.93 at the federal level, $17.57 in Oregon, $21.45 in New Jersey, $24.79 
in Connecticut, and $23.54 in Massachusetts.  Nominal and real federal and state minimum wage 
                                                                                                                                                             
At the state level, the cases  analyzed are: Oregon (1991), New Jersey (1992), Massachusetts (2000-2001) and 




averages are also included in the summary statistics, as well as average real wages for workers in 
the bottom two deciles of the wage distribution, which are $4.97 and $6.2 respectively. 
Whites represent 73.2 percent of the entire population; Blacks represent 8.9 percent, and 
Hispanics 13.1percent. At the state level races are represented as follow: 90.3 percent Whites, 
one  percent  Blacks,  and  5.5  percent  Hispanics  in  Oregon;  70.3  percent  Whites,  9.5  percent 
Blacks, and 15.2 percent Hispanics in New Jersey; 76.2 percent Whites, 10.8 percent Blacks, and 
10.7 percent Hispanics in Connecticut; 81.8 percent Whites, 6.7 percent Blacks, and 7.7 percent 
Hispanics in Massachusetts. 
Approximately one third of the entire population has a high school diploma, 27.2 percent 
of the population attended some college, while 26.5 percent have graduated from college or have 
a higher degree. At the state level, the percentage of population who earned at least a college 
degree  is  higher  than  the  overall  percentage  at  the  federal  level,  especially  in  New  Jersey, 
Connecticut  and  Massachusetts,  at  33.8,  36.2  and  38.3  percent  respectively.  Other  control 
variables  used  are  geographic  regions,  firm  size  and  occupation  dummies.  Health  insurance 
coverage rates by firm size, occupation and industry are presented in Appendix A, tables A.2 to 
A.4. 
 
5.  Empirical Strategy  
I use a difference-in-difference (DD) approach to assess the impact of the minimum wage 
on the employer-provided health insurance, a method used by other studies as well, especially 
those examining the employment effects of minimum wages. For increases in the state minimum 
wage  I  also  use  a  difference-in-difference-in-difference  (DDD)  method.  DD  estimation  is  a 
commonly used empirical technique in economics, it implies that there is a treatment group and a 15 
 
control group for which outcomes are compared before and after a change that affects only the 
treatment group: 
  , 1, , 1, ( ) ( ) t Treatm t Treatm t Control t Control HI HI HI HI − − − − −  
This  method  has  some  limitations,  as  mentioned  by  Bertrand,  Duflo,  Mullainathan 
(2004).  The  authors  note  that  the  presence  of  serial  correlation  can  lead  conventional  DD 
estimates to understate the true standard deviation of the estimated treatment effects, thus leading 
to overestimated t-statistics and significance levels. One possible solution is to collapse the data 
into pre- and post-periods and to cluster the standard errors at the appropriate level (e.g., state).  
Another difficulty is that DD estimates are sensitive to the choice of the pre- and post-periods as 
well as to the definition of the treatment and control groups (Brown 1999).  Both at the federal 
level and at the state level, I use two treatment groups, bottom 10% and bottom 20% wage 
earners. 
My study differs in a number of ways from that of both Beeson Royalty (2000) and 
Simon and Kaestner (2003).  In contrast to Beeson Royalty (2000), who examined changes in 
eligibility for health insurance, I examine changes in actual coverage rates.  Beeson Royalty 
(2000) captures the estimated effects of minimum wages with a variable that measures the real 
value of the federal or state minimum wage, whereas I use a dummy variable to indicate changes 
in federal or state minimum wage legislation.  Beeson Royalty (2000) analyzed only the 1988-
1993 period, while my analysis spans over a longer period of time, and is separated into six case 
studies, early and late 1990s at the federal level, and Oregon, New Jersey, Connecticut and 
Massachusetts at the state level. As a measure of low-skilled workers, the Beeson Royalty uses 
workers who earn less than $7 per hour or who have less than 12 years of education, while I 16 
 
define two treatment groups including individuals in the lowest 1 and 2 deciles of the hourly 
wage distribution. 
In contrast to Simon and Kaestner (2003), who use a quasi DD technique, I use a true DD 
estimation  and  allow  for  all  the  control  variables  to  vary  among  low-wage  and  high-wage 
earners.  Second,  I  explore  the  changes  in  the  employment-based  health  insurance  by  wage 
groups  and  by  demographic  groups,  while  Simon  and  Kaestner  explore  general  variation  in 
health insurance and pension provision for all individuals. Third, I define different treatment 
groups than the authors.
5  
There were several changes in the federal minimum wage during the period analyzed: the 
federal minimum wage increased to $3.80 in April 1990 from its previous level of $3.35, and to 
$4.25 in 1991. Two more increases took place in October 1996 and in September 1997, to $4.75 
and $5.15.
6   
The CPS questions referring to labor and income are retrospective. Hence, there is a lag 
between the actual change in minimum wage and the year reflected in my data.
7 To simplify the 
interpretation of results, I mention the actual year of change. For each federal minimum wage 
increase  I  compare  a  three-year  period  after  the  change  with  a  three-year  period  before  the 
                                                 
5 Simon and Kaestner use individuals that are earning less than $4, those earning between $4 and $5, and those 
earning between $5 and $8 per hour as comparison groups, while my treatment groups are bottom 10% and bottom 
20% wage earners. 
 
6  A  concern  about  the  changes  in  federal  minimum  wage  comes  from  the  fact  that  the  changes  took  place  in 
consecutive years: 1990, 1991 and 1996, 1997. This may lead to overlapping of the effects of minimum wage 
changes on the health insurance coverage rates. In trying to solve this shortcoming, I combine the changes in just 
two: 1990-91 change and 1996-97 respectively. I also  have a specification of the  model  where I look at both 
changes, and I compare the period after any of the two changes in the federal minimum wage with the period before 
the changes occurred.  
 
7 The change that took place in 1990 is reflected as taking place in 1991 in my data, while the 1991 change is 
actually reflected in 1992 data. Since the last two changes took place toward the end of 1996 and 1997, I consider 
that they had an effect on the variables in the next year. Therefore, there is a two-year lag between the year reflected 
in my data for the last two changes and the year when the actual change took place.  
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change, while at the state level I use two years before and two years after the increase in the 
minimum wage. A history of the changes in the federal and state minimum wages is attached in 
the Appendix A, Table A.5. 
In order to determine the case studies at the state level I examine all the changes in the 
state minimum wages along the period. In the 1990s several increases in the state minimum 
wages were just adjusting to the federal minimum wage level, while only a few states had higher 
increases than the federal minimum wage level. In the most recent years more states moved 
ahead and increased their minimum wage requirements above the federal level.
8 I expect to find 
evidence of the effect of increases in the state minimum wages on health insurance coverage 
rates mostly in states that had new levels of the minimum wage greater than the federal minimum 
wage and greater than the minimum wages in the neighboring states. Hence, there are just four 
case studies selected to be analyzed: Oregon (1991), New Jersey (1992), Massachusetts (2000-
2001) and Connecticut (2000- 2001). I use four years of data, two years before and two years 
after the state minimum wage change. A description of the state case  studies is included in 
Appendix A, tables A.7 to A.10. 
  I estimate the following regressions:  
(1)  0 1 2 3 ( 1) ( * ) P HI f Treatment After After Treatment X β β β β β = = + + + +  
and 
(2) 






P HI f State Treatment After
State Treatment State After After Treatment
State Treatment After X
β β β β
β β β
β β




                                                 
8 In 2005, 17 states had higher minimum wages than federal minimum wage, one state had a lower minimum wage, 25 
states had the same level of minimum wage as the federal level, and seven states did not have minimum wage laws. 
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where HI is a health insurance dummy variable equal to one if the individual is a policyholder of 
employment-based health insurance, and equal to zero otherwise; Treatment is a dummy variable 
for the treatment group (bottom 10% or bottom 20% wage earners);  After is a period dummy, 
State is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual lives in the state with the increase in 
minimum  wage,  and  zero  otherwise,  and  X is  a  vector  of  demographic  and  firm  specific 
characteristics.  The  impact  of  the  increase  in  federal  minimum  wage  on  the  change  in  the 
employer-provided health insurance coverage is captured by the interaction term between the 
period and the treatment group dummies. At the state level, the impact of the increase in the 
minimum wage is reflected by 7 β . To account for macroeconomic differences among states, I 
control for the unemployment rate at the state level using March unemployment rates for each 
state and each year. The regressions weighted using individual weights.  
Along  with  estimating  probit  regression,  I  estimate  the  probability  of  being  a 
policyholder  of  employment-based  health  insurance  and  the  difference  in  these  probabilities 
between the treatment group and the control group. The standard errors are calculated using two 
hundred bootstrap replications.  
The  bootstrap  is  a  type  of  Monte  Carlo  simulation  which  requires  little  additional 
programming besides the program code for the actual model. As noted in Cameron and Trivedi 
(2005),  the  bootstrap  is  useful  in  computing  standard  errors  when  analytical  formulas  are 
complex (pp. 255). The procedure involves choosing random samples with replacement from a 
data set and analyzing each sample the same way. A bootstrap distribution approximates the 
sampling distribution of the statistic and it is used as a way to estimate the variation in a statistic 
based on the original data. Bootstrap distributions imitate the shape, spread, and bias of sampling 
distributions. Almost all of the variation among bootstrap distributions for a statistic is due to the 19 
 
selection  of  the  original  random  sample  from  the  population,  resampling  introduces  little 
additional variation. The bootstrap can estimate the sampling distribution, bias, and standard 
error of a wide variety of statistics. The bootstrap standard error of a statistic is the standard 
deviation of its bootstrap distribution; it measures how much the statistic varies under random 
sampling.  
The  advantage  of  bootstrapping  over  analytical  methods  is  its  great  simplicity;  it  is 
straightforward  to  apply  the  bootstrap  to  derive  estimates  of  standard  errors  and  confidence 
intervals for complex estimators of complex parameters of the distribution. However, there are 
some disadvantages as well: while under some conditions it is asymptotically consistent, it does 
not provide general finite sample guarantees, and has a tendency to be overly optimistic.  
 
6.  Results 
 
The  estimates  of  the  probability  of  being  policyholder  of  employment-based  health 
insurance after changes in minimum wage take place at the federal level and at the state level are 
presented in Tables 1 to 6. Along with estimating the probability of being insured for everyone I 
examine different groups of workers: individuals younger than 40, individuals working in small 
size firms, and young individuals working in small firms. I also examine the variation in the 
probabilities by race and ethnicity. 
Table  1  includes  the  probability  of  being  policyholder  of  employment-based  health 
insurance  after  1990-91  changes  in  the  federal  minimum  wage  and  the  difference  in  these 
probabilities between the treatment and the control group. Regardless of the treatment group, 
bottom 10 or bottom 20% wage earners, almost all the specifications suggest that being in the 
treatment  group  after  the  1990-91  changes  in  the  federal  minimum  wage  does  not  have  a 
negative  impact  on  one’s  probability  of  having  employment-based  health  insurance  in  owns 20 
 
name. The only exception in the early 90s comes from the race group Others. The difference-in-
difference coefficients suggest that being in the bottom 10% or bottom 20% wage earners makes 
an individual 2.7 and 1 percent less likely to be a policyholder compared to the control group, 
non-bottom 10% and non-bottom 20% wage earners respectively. Among the workers included 
in the treatment group predicted probabilities of being insured vary from 11 percentage points for 
young adults working in small firms to 32 percentage points for Blacks before the increase in 
minimum wage, and from 10.5 percentage points for young adults working in small firms to 30.8 
percentage points for Blacks after the increase in minimum wage. The estimated probabilities of 
being  insured  among  the  control  group  are,  not  surprisingly,  much  higher,  around  33-35 
percentage  points  for  young  workers  and  those  working  in  small  firms,  and  around  55-65 
percentage points for everybody else. 
Estimates of the impact of the 1996-97 changes in the federal minimum wage on the 
probability of being a policyholder of employment-based health insurance among treatment and 
control groups are presented in Table 2. While in the early 90s only the difference-in-difference 
coefficient for Others suggested a negative impact of the minimum wage changes, in the late 90s 
the  probability  of  being  policyholder  of  employment-based  health  insurance  is  negatively 
affected for small size firms, for young adults as well as for Others. The workers in the treatment 
group have predicted probabilities of being insured of about 20 to 30 percentage points, while the 
probabilities for the workers in the control group span from 30 to 65 percentage points. The 
predicted probabilities are not too far off from the actual coverage rates along the period. Details 
about the sample size for each case study and the actual coverage rates through employment-
based health insurance are presented in Appendix B, tables B.1 to B.6, corresponding to tables 1 
to 6.  21 
 
In a recent article, Abraham, DeLeire and Beeson Royalty (2007) estimate the provision 
of several components of the compensation package in the small firms, and conclude, among 
other, that “workers employed at small firms are substantially less likely to be offered health 
insurance than those at larger firms.” In this context, I obtain similar estimates for the workers in 
small firms after the 1996-97 minimum wage change. The difference-in-difference coefficient 
implies that being in the treatment group makes an individual about one to three percentage 
points less likely to have health insurance through employer compared to the control group. 
Standard errors are larger than the coefficients making the results not very strong.  
The results at the state level are presented in separate tables for each case study. The 
difference-in-difference coefficients for the Oregon increase in the minimum wage, included in 
Table 3, suggest a negative impact of being in the bottom 10% wage earners for everyone, for 
young workers, for individuals working in small firms, and for Whites. However, the results are 
opposite when the treatment group is defined as bottom 20% wage earners. The gap in predicted 
probabilities of being insured as well as the gap between the actual coverage rates for the control 
and  treatment  group  are  bigger  for  bottom  and  non-bottom  10%  wage  earners  compared  to 
bottom and non-bottom 20% wage earners. 
Table 4 includes the estimated probabilities of being policyholder of employment-based 
health insurance before  and after the New Jersey  increase in minimum wage. The predicted 
probabilities of being insured vary roughly between 15 and 30 percentage points among the 
treatment group, and between 35 and 55 percentage points for the control group. No matter what 
the treatment group is, the New Jersey minimum wage increase has a negative impact on the 
probability  of  being  insured  for  the  treatment  group  compared  to  the  control  group.  The 
difference-in-difference coefficients are suggestive, but not statistically significant. For example, 22 
 
being  in  the  bottom  10%  wage  earners  makes  a  White  individual  3.7%  less  likely  to  be  a 
policyholder of employment-based health insurance than a White non-bottom 10% wage earner. 
Similarly, being in the bottom 20% wage earners makes a White individual 1.6% less likely to 
have health insurance coverage through employer than a White worker in the control group.  
The difference-in-difference coefficients for the Connecticut increase in the minimum 
wage and the estimates of the predicted probabilities of having health insurance through the 
employer are displayed in Table 5. Approximately half the specifications suggest a negative 
impact of being in the treatment group. While the predicted probabilities are lower after the 
increase  in  minimum  wage,  both  for  the  treatment  group  and  the  control  group,  in  some 
specifications the negative impact of the increase is higher for the workers paid lower wages.  
Table 6 contains more consistent difference-in-difference estimates for the Massachusetts 
increase in minimum wage. These estimates vary between 3 and 41 percentage points, with the 
extremes obtained for young individuals in the bottom two hourly wage deciles, and for Blacks 
in the first decile. The sample size varies along the period making the interpretation of the results 
a little difficult because part of the estimated change in the probability may simply occur due to 
this.  
The 1990-91 minimum wage changes at the federal level, as well as the state level change 
in Oregon exhibit a positive effect on the coverage rates of employment-based health insurance 
for  most  of  the  specifications,  even  when  I  control  for  the  unemployment  rate.  A  possible 
explanation for this may be that the economy is recovering after a severe recession and the 
unemployment rate may not capture all the changes in the economy. At the state level, some of 
the marginal effects are very high; this may be due, in part, to the small sample size in the 
regressions. 23 
 
Another possible explanation for the positive effects of increases in minimum wage on 
the coverage rates of employment-based health insurance is that big firms are more likely to 
adjust  on  the  margin  of  co-pay.  I  observe  whether  an  individual  is  covered  or  not  by 
employment-based health insurance through employer, but I have no information on how much 
the employer and the employee are paying, or on the health insurance package. It may be the 
case that employers would raise the price of insurance rather than dropping coverage in response 
to a minimum wage increase. In this context, my results should be considered a lower bound of 
the effect. 
Also, to the extent that the share of low wage workers changes within the firms after a 
change in minimum wage takes place, it may be harder to identify the negative effect of this 
increase  on  the  fringe  benefits  offered  to  low  wage  workers.  This  may  bias  the  results  by 
understating the true effect. 
 
7.  Conclusions 
 
General  studies  regarding  the  variation  in  health  insurance  coverage  rates  over  time 
suggest  that  the  decline  in  health  insurance  coverage  may  be  caused  by  an  increase  in  the 
Medicaid eligibility, an economic recession, or an increase in the premiums that individuals have 
to pay. Studies which examined the relationship between the minimum wage and the fringe 
benefits  failed  to  provide  evidence  that  increased  minimum  wages  reduce  the  fringe  benefit 
receipt. Most of the previous literature has focused on the employment effects of the minimum 
wage, while the effects on the provision of fringe benefits were understudied by the researchers. 
Using CPS data from 1988 to 2005, I examine the effects of minimum wage increases on 
the probability of having employment-based health insurance for bottom 10% and bottom 20% 
wage earners, compared to non-bottom 10% and non-bottom 20% wage earners.   24 
 
At the federal level I find some evidence that employees in small firms, especially the 
younger ones, were negatively affected by changes in minimum wage that occurred in the late 
1990s but not in the earlier 1990s. At the state level I analyze four case studies, Oregon (1991), 
New Jersey (1992), Connecticut (2000-2001) and Massachusetts (2000-2001), and I find more 
suggestive  results  of  a  negative  impact  of  the  minimum  wage  increases.  New  Jersey  and 
Massachusetts  exhibit  negative  effects  of  being  in  the treatment  group  on  the  probability  of 
having employment-based health insurance for most of the specifications, while the results in 
Oregon and Connecticut are more sensitive to the specification. The results suggest that being in 
the treatment group makes individuals 3 to 4 percentage points less likely to be policyholders of 
employment-based health insurance compared to the control group.  
Future research may extend the case studies to the new increases in the federal minimum 
wage, which take place starting with the summer of 2007. It may also expand the analysis to 
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Table 1: 1990-91 Federal Minimum Wage Change and Estimated Predicted 
Coverage by Employment-Based Health Insurance. 
  Treatment  Control 
DD  St. Err  Sample  Wage  Before  After  Before  After 
Everyone  10%  0.199  0.200  0.616  0.596  0.021  0.007 
Age<40  10%  0.177  0.178  0.587  0.561  0.028  0.009 
Fsize25  10%  0.127  0.129  0.335  0.324  0.015  0.010 
Fsize25 &age  10%  0.114  0.105  0.331  0.316  0.003  0.012 
White  10%  0.203  0.206  0.629  0.612  0.021  0.009 
Black  10%  0.222  0.241  0.635  0.599  0.060  0.023 
Hispanic  10%  0.170  0.153  0.522  0.489  0.009  0.018 
Other  10%  0.199  0.198  0.553  0.578  -0.027  0.039 
Everyone  20%  0.273  0.261  0.642  0.623  0.005  0.005 
Age<40  20%  0.249  0.234  0.619  0.594  0.009  0.006 
Fsize25  20%  0.160  0.157  0.352  0.340  0.008  0.007 
Fsize25&age  20%  0.150  0.142  0.352  0.336  0.005  0.009 
White  20%  0.274  0.267  0.653  0.636  0.009  0.006 
Black  20%  0.327  0.308  0.662  0.631  0.010  0.015 
Hispanic  20%  0.235  0.212  0.561  0.527  0.007  0.013 
Other  20%  0.246  0.260  0.579  0.605  -0.010  0.024 
Note: Each line represents a separate regression. 
 
Table 2: 1996-97 Federal Minimum Wage Change and Estimated Predicted 
Coverage by Employment-Based Health Insurance. 
  Treatment  Control 
DD  St. Err  Sample  Wage  Before  After  Before  After 
Everyone  10%  0.234  0.242  0.606  0.599  0.016  0.007 
Age<40  10%  0.197  0.205  0.557  0.555  0.012  0.009 
Fsize25  10%  0.152  0.142  0.339  0.335  -0.008  0.010 
Fsize25 &age  10%  0.124  0.120  0.318  0.318  -0.005  0.013 
White  10%  0.242  0.250  0.626  0.619  0.016  0.009 
Black  10%  0.293  0.327  0.616  0.633  0.020  0.021 
Hispanic  10%  0.190  0.186  0.500  0.486  0.010  0.014 
Other  10%  0.261  0.221  0.600  0.554  -0.001  0.033 
Everyone  20%  0.288  0.295  0.631  0.623  0.016  0.005 
Age<40  20%  0.249  0.258  0.588  0.585  0.013  0.006 
Fsize25  20%  0.181  0.168  0.354  0.351  -0.013  0.008 
Fsize25&age  20%  0.158  0.148  0.338  0.338  -0.014  0.010 
White  20%  0.296  0.302  0.647  0.640  0.015  0.006 
Black  20%  0.344  0.385  0.642  0.656  0.028  0.015 
Hispanic  20%  0.250  0.242  0.534  0.522  0.004  0.010 
Other  20%  0.307  0.268  0.624  0.578  0.003  0.025 










Table 3: Oregon Minimum Wage Change and Estimated Predicted Coverage by 
Employment-Based Health Insurance. 
  Treatment  Control 
DD  St. Err  Sample  Wage  Before  After  Before  After 
Everyone  10%  0.175  0.148  0.483  0.504  -0.054  0.079 
Age<40  10%  0.074  0.091  0.269  0.306  -0.012  0.078 
Fsize25  10%  0.173  0.155  0.450  0.459  -0.029  0.098 
Fsize25 &age  10%  0.093  0.102  0.268  0.274  0.007  0.114 
White  10%  0.212  0.171  0.540  0.568  -0.078  0.089 
Black  10%  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Hispanic  10%  0.190  0.238  0.443  0.329  0.164  0.313 
Other  10%  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Everyone  20%  0.220  0.269  0.502  0.517  0.035  0.055 
Age<40  20%  0.098  0.167  0.285  0.322  0.050  0.056 
Fsize25  20%  0.217  0.292  0.474  0.476  0.075  0.063 
Fsize25&age  20%  0.105  0.167  0.289  0.290  0.075  0.086 
White  20%  0.251  0.289  0.553  0.579  0.015  0.064 
Black  20%  0.000  0.640  0.484  0.509  0.575  0.181 
Hispanic  20%  0.297  0.331  0.475  0.341  0.168  0.168 
Other  20%  0.129  0.166  0.447  0.484  0.002  0.242 
Note: Each line represents a separate regression. 
 
 
Table 4: New Jersey Minimum Wage Change and Estimated Predicted Coverage by 
Employment-Based Health Insurance. 
  Treatment  Control 
DD  St. Err  Sample  Wage  Before  After  Before  After 
Everyone  10%  0.197  0.198  0.524  0.527  -0.002  0.052 
Age<40  10%  0.135  0.157  0.370  0.377  0.022  0.070 
Fsize25  10%  0.184  0.174  0.492  0.491  -0.011  0.066 
Fsize25 &age  10%  0.149  0.123  0.363  0.363  -0.037  0.100 
White  10%  0.197  0.170  0.560  0.563  -0.037  0.065 
Black  10%  0.234  0.322  0.481  0.481  0.083  0.152 
Hispanic  10%  0.196  0.218  0.363  0.349  0.033  0.117 
Other  10%  0.151  0.235  0.442  0.480  0.052  0.258 
Everyone  20%  0.276  0.254  0.533  0.540  -0.029  0.028 
Age<40  20%  0.176  0.165  0.382  0.398  -0.029  0.054 
Fsize25  20%  0.237  0.235  0.505  0.508  -0.005  0.038 
Fsize25&age  20%  0.150  0.134  0.382  0.389  -0.029  0.068 
White  20%  0.255  0.246  0.570  0.575  -0.016  0.043 
Black  20%  0.385  0.301  0.483  0.497  -0.088  0.084 
Hispanic  20%  0.272  0.264  0.370  0.360  0.005  0.058 
Other  20%  0.187  0.202  0.447  0.501  -0.037  0.159 










Table 5: Connecticut Minimum Wage Changes and Estimated Predicted Coverage 
by Employment-Based Health Insurance. 
  Treatment  Control 
DD  St. Err  Sample  Wage  Before  After  Before  After 
Everyone  10%  0.215  0.201  0.509  0.523  -0.031  0.092 
Age<40  10%  0.199  0.087  0.328  0.368  -0.190  0.164 
Fsize25  10%  0.168  0.122  0.442  0.459  -0.078  0.118 
Fsize25 &age  10%  -  -  -  -  -  - 
White  10%  0.267  0.188  0.556  0.569  -0.112  0.104 
Black  10%  0.205  0.232  0.490  0.504  0.016  0.177 
Hispanic  10%  0.115  0.164  0.367  0.377  0.047  0.166 
Other  10%  0.000  0.406  0.402  0.452  0.439  0.138 
Everyone  20%  0.229  0.285  0.526  0.537  0.050  0.060 
Age<40  20%  0.186  0.185  0.348  0.389  -0.040  0.108 
Fsize25  20%  0.181  0.243  0.460  0.473  0.057  0.075 
Fsize25&age  20%  -  -  -  -  -  - 
White  20%  0.291  0.292  0.570  0.580  -0.009  0.069 
Black  20%  0.180  0.284  0.509  0.516  0.102  0.115 
Hispanic  20%  0.093  0.241  0.382  0.388  0.147  0.100 
Other  20%  0.298  0.336  0.419  0.465  -0.013  0.380 
Note: Each line represents a separate regression. 
 
Table 6: Massachusetts Minimum Wage Changes and Estimated Predicted Coverage 
by Employment-Based Health Insurance. 
  Treatment  Control 
DD  St. Err  Sample  Wage  Before  After  Before  After 
Everyone  10%  0.246  0.194  0.523  0.520  -0.062  0.059 
Age<40  10%  0.224  0.160  0.352  0.351  -0.081  0.096 
Fsize25  10%  0.177  0.103  0.449  0.453  -0.106  0.074 
Fsize25 &age  10%  0.173  0.049  0.321  0.318  -0.176  0.112 
White  10%  0.233  0.216  0.559  0.561  -0.025  0.076 
Black  10%  0.538  0.082  0.484  0.433  -0.414  0.151 
Hispanic  10%  0.152  0.127  0.348  0.375  -0.056  0.151 
Other  10%  0.156  0.379  0.457  0.466  0.246  0.264 
Everyone  20%  0.309  0.232  0.539  0.536  -0.084  0.039 
Age<40  20%  0.195  0.169  0.371  0.371  -0.031  0.068 
Fsize25  20%  0.263  0.149  0.466  0.471  -0.136  0.057 
Fsize25&age  20%  0.186  0.083  0.342  0.343  -0.139  0.079 
White  20%  0.304  0.258  0.573  0.576  -0.056  0.053 
Black  20%  0.571  0.125  0.499  0.441  -0.370  0.113 
Hispanic  20%  0.104  0.151  0.364  0.386  0.031  0.079 
Other  20%  0.314  0.428  0.480  0.489  0.107  0.218 












Descriptive Statistics and Case Studies Description 
 
 
Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics 
   Federal  OR  NJ  CT  MA 
Variable  Mean 
Std. 
Dev.  Mean 
Std. 
Dev.  Mean 
Std. 
Dev.  Mean 
Std. 
Dev.  Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Year  1996  5.419  1991  1.565  1992  1.582  2001  1.864  2001  2.054 
Health Insurance Variable  0.573  0.495  0.601  0.49  0.619  0.486  0.599  0.49  0.571  0.495 
Male  0.526  0.499  0.533  0.499  0.532  0.499  0.498  0.5  0.503  0.5 
Female  0.474  0.499  0.467  0.499  0.468  0.499  0.502  0.5  0.497  0.5 
Married  0.625  0.484  0.67  0.47  0.616  0.486  0.648  0.478  0.588  0.492 
Number of children  0.991  1.179  0.949  1.164  0.958  1.136  1.092  1.146  0.982  1.16 
White  0.732  0.443  0.903  0.296  0.703  0.457  0.762  0.426  0.825  0.38 
Black  0.089  0.284  0.01  0.098  0.095  0.293  0.098  0.297  0.058  0.234 
Hispanic  0.131  0.337  0.055  0.228  0.152  0.359  0.103  0.303  0.079  0.27 
Other  0.048  0.215  0.033  0.177  0.05  0.218  0.037  0.19  0.038  0.191 
Age 18-19  0.031  0.173  0.025  0.156  0.027  0.161  0.023  0.151  0.025  0.158 
Age 25-29  0.12  0.325  0.108  0.311  0.126  0.331  0.072  0.259  0.109  0.311 
Age 30-34  0.138  0.345  0.136  0.343  0.14  0.347  0.113  0.316  0.123  0.329 
Age 35-39  0.144  0.351  0.173  0.379  0.147  0.354  0.147  0.354  0.145  0.352 
Age 40-44  0.143  0.35  0.161  0.367  0.145  0.352  0.185  0.388  0.155  0.362 
Age 45-49  0.123  0.329  0.134  0.34  0.122  0.328  0.15  0.357  0.136  0.343 
Age 50-54  0.096  0.294  0.074  0.262  0.099  0.298  0.114  0.318  0.117  0.322 
Age 55-59  0.067  0.25  0.061  0.239  0.064  0.246  0.079  0.27  0.076  0.265 
Age 60-64  0.04  0.196  0.038  0.19  0.043  0.204  0.048  0.214  0.04  0.195 
Less than 9 grade  0.039  0.195  0.027  0.162  0.033  0.179  0.017  0.129  0.031  0.173 
Grade 9-11  0.068  0.252  0.066  0.249  0.053  0.224  0.045  0.208  0.048  0.214 
High school  0.344  0.475  0.328  0.469  0.348  0.476  0.303  0.46  0.289  0.453 
Some college  0.272  0.445  0.306  0.461  0.231  0.422  0.254  0.435  0.238  0.426 
College or more  0.265  0.441  0.266  0.442  0.328  0.47  0.362  0.481  0.383  0.486 
Real Hourly Wage  18.93  16.97  17.57  11.55  21.45  15.98  24.79  22.42  23.55  21.65 
Real Hourly Wage–Decile 1  4.97  0.97  4.97  0.97  4.98  0.97  4.96  1.00  4.88  0.95 
Real Hourly Wage–Decile 2  6.21  1.42  6.30  1.44  6.26  1.40  6.28  1.48  6.17  1.40 
State Minimum Wage   3.87  1.75  4.06  0.70  4.56  0.39  6.35  0.73  6.08  0.75 
Real State Minimum Wage  4.81  1.95  5.84  0.70  6.05  0.28  6.98  0.52  6.80  0.51 
Federal Minimum Wage  4.51  0.67  3.92  0.37  4.25  0.00  5.15  0.00  5.15  0.00 
Real Federal Minimum 
Wage  5.66  0.26  5.66  0.23  5.642  0.243  5.69  0.27  5.79  0.30 













Table A.2: Health Insurance Coverage Rates by Firm Size 
 
Firm Size  Obs  Mean 
Less than 25  362,609  31.3% 
25-99  160,601  58.0% 
100-499  173,759  68.2% 
500-999  69,726  71.3% 
1000 and more  468,346  73.5% 
 
 
Table A.3: Health Insurance Coverage Rates by Occupations 
 
Occupation  Obs  Mean 
Profesionals   269,457  69.5% 
Managers  181,806  66.2% 
Operatives  135,066  61.1% 
Craftsmen  131,035  60.8% 
Sales  75,874  51.3% 
Laborers  48,932  44.8% 
Service  167,223  38.9% 
Farmers  20,574  20.3% 
Other occupations  18,783  9.0% 
 
 
Table A.4: Health Insurance Coverage Rates by Industry 
 
Industry  Obs  Mean 
Public Administration  68,680  82.1% 
Durable Goods  116,475  77.7% 
Transport & utilities  72,888  72.9% 
Non-durable Goods  76,264  71.9% 
Finance  82,346  65.9% 
Services  451,255  55.4% 
Trade  244,043  44.6% 
Agriculture  32,886  24.2% 





Table A.5: Federal and State Minimum Wage History 
 
Year  1988  1991  1992  1994  1996  1997  1998  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 
Federal  3.35  3.8  4.25  4.25  4.25  4.75  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15 
Alabama  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Alaska  3.85  4.3  4.75  4.75  4.75  5.25  5.65  5.65  5.65  5.65  7.15  7.15 
Arizona                          
Arkansas  3.25  3.35  3.65  4.25  4.25  4.25  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15 
California  3.35  4.25  4.25  4.25  4.25  4.75  5.15  5.75  6.25  6.75  6.75  6.75 
Colorado  3  3  3  3  3  4.75  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15 
Connecticut  3.75  4.25  4.27  4.27  4.27  4.77  5.18  6.15  6.4  6.7  6.9  7.1 









5.45  4.25  5.25  5.75  6.15  6.15  6.15  6.15  6.15  6.15 
Florida  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Georgia  3.25  3.25  3.25  3.25  3.25  3.25  3.25  3.25  3.25  5.15  5.15  5.15 
Hawaii  3.85  3.85  3.85  5.25  5.25  5.25  5.25  5.25  5.25  5.75  6.25  6.25 
Idaho  2.3  3.8  4.25  4.25  4.25  4.25  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15 
Illinois  3.35  3.8  4.25  4.25  4.25  4.75  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.5 
Indiana  2  3.35  3.35  3.35  3.35  3.35  3.35  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15 
Iowa     4.25  4.65  4.65  4.65  4.75  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15 
Kansas  1.6  2.65  2.65  2.65  2.65  2.65  2.65  2.65  2.65  2.65  2.65  2.65 
Kentucky  3.35  3.8  4.25  4.25  4.25  4.25  4.25  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15 
Louisiana  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Maine  3.65  3.85  4.25  4.25  4.25  4.75  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.75  6.25  6.25 
Maryland  3.35  3.8  4.25  4.25  4.25  4.75  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15 
Massachusetts  3.65  3.75  4.25  4.25  4.75  5.25  5.25  6  6.75  6.75  6.75  6.75 
Michigan  3.35  3.35  3.35  3.35  3.35  3.35  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15 
Minnesota 
3.55-











Mississippi  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Missouri     3.8  4.25  4.25  4.25  4.75  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15 
Montana  3.35  3.8  4.25  4.25  4.25  4.75  5.15  4-5.15 
4-
5.15  4-5.15  4-5.15  4-5.15 
Nebraska  3.35  3.35  4.25  4.25  4.25  4.25  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15 
Nevada  3.35  3.8  4.25  4.25  4.25  4.75  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15 
New Hampshire  3.55  3.85  4.25  4.25  4.25  4.75  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15 
New Jersey  3.35  3.8 
4.25
/5.0
5  5.05  5.05  5.05  5.05  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15 
New Mexico  3.35  3.35  3.35  4.25  4.25  4.25  4.25  4.25  4.25  4.25  4.25  5.15 
New York  3.35  3.8  4.25  4.25  4.25  4.25  4.25  4.25  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15 
North Carolina  3.35  3.35  3.8  4.25  4.25  4.25  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15 
North Dakota 
2.8-
3.1  3.4  4.25  4.25  4.25  4.75  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15 











Oklahoma  3.35  3.8  4.25  4.25  4.25  4.75  5.15  2-5.15 
2-
5.15  2-5.15  2-5.15  2-5.15 
Oregon  3.35  4.75  4.75  4.75  4.75  5.5  6  6.5  6.5  6.5  6.9  7.05 
Pennsylvania  3.35  3.85  4.25  4.25  4.25  4.75  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15 
Rhode Island  3.65  4.25  4.45  4.45  4.45  5.15  5.15  5.65  6.15  6.15  6.15  6.75 






Table A.5: (Continued) 
 
South Dakota  2.8  3.8  4.25  4.25  4.25  4.25  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15 
Tennessee  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Texas  3.35  3.35  3.35  3.35  3.35  3.35  3.35  3.35  3.35  5.15  5.15  5.15 
Utah  2.75  3.8  4.25  4.25  4.25  4.75  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15 
Vermont  3.55  3.85  4.25  4.25  4.75  5  5.25  5.75  6.25  6.25  6.25  6.75 
Virginia  2.65  2.65  3.65  4.25  4.25  4.75  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15 
Washington  2.3  4.25  4.25  4.25  4.9  4.9  4.9  6.5  6.72  6.9  7.01  7.16 
West Virginia  3.35  3.35  3.8  4.25  4.25  4.25  4.75  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15 
Wisconsin  3.35  3.8  3.8  4.25  4.25  4.75  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15 
Wyoming  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  5.15  5.15  5.15 
Note: Changes in basic minimum wages in non-farm employment under state law: Selected years, 1988 to 2004, as of 




Table A.6:  Federal Minimum Wage 
Changes 
 
Date  Value 
Jan-87  3.35 
Apr-90  3.80 
Apr-91  4.25 
Oct-96  4.75 
Sep-97  5.15 
Jan-01  5.15 
Notes: At the federal level, I use three years prior to the change and three 
years after. In this table I only report the actual changes in minimum 
wage,  and  the  level  at  the  beginning  and  at  the  end  of  the  period 
analyzed.  I  selected  two  changes:  1990-1991  and  1996-1997.  The 
window  for  each  change  is  1987-1989  and  1992-1994  for  the  first 




Table A.7:  Oregon Case Study 
 
State or Jurisdiction  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993 
Oregon  3.35  4.25  4.75  4.75  4.75 
California  4.25  4.25  4.25  4.25  4.25 
Idaho  2.30  3.80  3.80  4.25  4.25 
Nevada  3.35  3.35  3.80  4.25  4.25 
Washington  3.85  4.25  4.25  4.25  4.25 
Federal  3.35  3.35  3.80  4.25  4.25 
Notes: I report the state minimum wages for Oregon, for its neighbors, and for the federal level. The 
shaded represent the years with a change in state minimum wage; two years prior to the change and 








Table A.8: New Jersey Case Study 
 
State or Jurisdiction  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994 
New Jersey  3.80  4.25  5.05  5.05  5.05 
Delaware  3.80  4.25  4.25  4.25  4.65 
Maryland  3.80  4.25  4.25  4.25  4.25 
New York  3.80  4.25  4.25  4.25  4.25 
Pennsylvania  3.80  4.25  4.25  4.25  4.25 
Connecticut  3.80  4.27  4.27  4.27  4.27 
Federal  3.80  4.25  4.25  4.25  4.25 
Notes: I report the state minimum wages for New Jersey, for its neighbors, and for the federal level. 
The shaded represent the years with a change in state minimum wage; two years prior to the change 
and two years after the change are also included in the tables. 
 
 
Table A.9:  Connecticut Case Study 
 
State or Jurisdiction  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
Connecticut  5.18  5.18  6.15  6.40  6.70  6.90 
New Jersey  5.05  5.05  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15 
Rhode Island  5.15  5.15  5.65  6.15  6.15  6.15 
New York  4.25  4.25  4.25  5.15  5.15  5.15 
Federal  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15 
Notes: I report the state minimum wages for Connecticut, for its neighbors, and for the federal level. The shaded 
represent the years with a change in state minimum wage; two years prior to the change and two years after the 
change are also included in the tables. 
 
 
Table A.10: Massachusetts Case Study 
 
State or Jurisdiction  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
Massachusetts  5.25  5.25  6.00  6.75  6.75  6.75 
Rhode Island  5.15  5.15  5.65  6.15  6.15  6.15 
New York  4.25  4.25  4.25  5.15  5.15  5.15 
New Hampshire  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15 
Vermont  5.25  5.25  5.75  6.25  6.25  6.25 
Federal  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15  5.15 
Notes: I report the state minimum wages for Massachusetts, for its neighbors, and for the federal level. The shaded 
represent the years with a change in state minimum wage; two years prior to the change and two years after the 
change are also included in the tables. 
 










Sample Size and Coverage Rates Corresponding to Each Case Study 
 
Table B.1: Early 90s Federal Level Coverage Rates of Employment-Based Health Insurance and the Sample 
Size 
Sample  Wage 
Treatment Group Workers  Control Group Workers 
Before  After  Before  After 
Rates  #Obs  Rates  #Obs  Rates  #Obs  Rates  #Obs 
Everyone  10%  19.30%  12,745  19.40%  12,443  61.60%  185,711  59.50%  180,356 
Age<40  10%  17.20%  9,295  17.00%  8,866  59.00%  108,014  55.60%  97,717 
Fsize25  10%  13.40%  5,425  12.30%  5,045  33.30%  51,687  32.50%  50,641 
Fsize25 &age  10%  11.80%  3,666  10.10%  3,342  33.30%  29,173  31.30%  26,388 
White  10%  19.60%  9,010  20.10%  8,184  62.80%  146,090  61.20%  137,796 
Black  10%  21.40%  1,457  23.90%  1,320  63.40%  14,877  60.50%  14,443 
Hispanic  10%  16.10%  1,884  15.10%  2,418  52.10%  18,642  48.90%  20,595 
Other  10%  19.50%  394  18.40%  521  57.30%  6,102  57.20%  7,522 
Everyone  20%  27.80%  12,533  30.10%  15,571  62.40%  169,399  62.80%  201,256 
Age<40  20%  24.20%  8,751  25.70%  10,354  58.50%  89,596  58.50%  98,454 
Fsize25  20%  17.50%  5,130  17.70%  6,050  34.40%  46,942  36.10%  54,770 
Fsize25&age  20%  15.30%  3,315  15.00%  3,826  33.00%  23,904  34.70%  25,719 
White  20%  28.50%  7,960  30.90%  8,928  63.90%  127,496  64.40%  141,836 
Black  20%  33.60%  1,332  38.30%  1,737  64.50%  14,017  65.50%  19,121 
Hispanic  20%  22.90%  2,636  24.90%  4,091  52.50%  20,620  53.00%  29,713 
Other  20%  27.20%  605  30.30%  815  59.70%  7,266  61.00%  10,586 
Note: This table corresponds to Table 1. 
 
Table B.2: Late 90s Federal Level Coverage Rates of Employment-Based Health Insurance and the Sample Size 
Sample  Wage 
Treatment Group Workers  Control Group Workers 
Before  After  Before  After 
Rates  #Obs  Rates  #Obs  Rates  #Obs  Rates  #Obs 
Everyone  10%  22.1%  12,533  24.1%  15,571  59.9%  169,399  60.4%  201,256 
Age<40  10%  18.8%  8,751  19.7%  10,354  55.4%  89,596  55.5%  98,454 
Fsize25  10%  14.7%  5,130  14.6%  6,050  33.0%  46,942  34.5%  54,770 
Fsize25 &age  10%  12.1%  3,315  12.0%  3,826  31.2%  23,904  32.5%  25,719 
White  10%  22.7%  7,960  24.8%  8,928  61.7%  127,496  62.5%  141,836 
Black  10%  28.2%  1,332  32.2%  1,737  61.9%  14,017  63.3%  19,121 
Hispanic  10%  17.2%  2,636  18.7%  4,091  48.9%  20,620  49.4%  29,713 
Other  10%  21.5%  605  25.9%  815  57.3%  7,266  58.6%  10,586 
Everyone  20%  27.8%  26,831  30.1%  33,001  62.4%  155,103  62.8%  183,828 
Age<40  20%  24.2%  18,161  25.7%  21,255  58.5%  80,188  58.5%  87,555 
Fsize25  20%  17.5%  10,030  17.7%  11,760  34.4%  42,044  36.1%  49,062 
Fsize25&age  20%  15.3%  6,443  15.0%  7,308  33.0%  20,778  34.7%  22,239 
White  20%  28.5%  17,180  30.9%  18,793  63.9%  118,278  64.4%  131,973 
Black  20%  33.6%  2,765  38.3%  3,686  64.5%  12,586  65.5%  17,174 
Hispanic  20%  22.9%  5,633  24.9%  8,789  52.5%  17,625  53.0%  25,017 
Other  20%  27.2%  1,256  30.3%  1,736  59.7%  6,617  61.0%  9,667 







Table B.3: Oregon Coverage Rates of Employment-Based Health Insurance and the Sample Size 
Sample  Wage 
Treatment Group Workers  Control Group Workers 
Before  After  Before  After 
Rates  #Obs  Rates  #Obs  Rates  #Obs  Rates  #Obs 
Everyone  10%  17.3%  1,124  14.5%  1,070  57.8%  17,681  56.6%  15,850 
Age<40  10%  18.1%  852  12.5%  789  53.9%  10,610  52.5%  8,966 
Fsize25  10%  11.8%  533  8.1%  457  30.0%  5,372  28.3%  4,765 
Fsize25 &age  10%  11.7%  368  6.9%  318  28.3%  3,178  26.7%  2,619 
White  10%  19.9%  602  16.6%  465  61.8%  11,258  60.9%  9,772 
Black  10%  27.8%  18  20.0%  30  67.5%  680  60.2%  548 
Hispanic  10%  14.6%  444  12.2%  509  47.2%  4,471  45.9%  4,201 
Other  10%  8.3%  60  15.2%  66  55.3%  1,272  56.5%  1,329 
Everyone  20%  21.2%  2,579  21.8%  2,346  60.8%  16,226  59.1%  14,574 
Age<40  20%  20.3%  1,934  20.3%  1,736  57.6%  9,528  55.5%  8,019 
Fsize25  20%  12.6%  1,065  11.1%  934  31.8%  4,840  29.9%  4,288 
Fsize25&age  20%  12.1%  754  10.8%  674  30.4%  2,792  28.6%  2,263 
White  20%  25.3%  1,298  25.1%  996  63.9%  10,562  62.6%  9,241 
Black  20%  33.3%  42  22.1%  68  68.6%  656  62.9%  510 
Hispanic  20%  16.5%  1,092  18.3%  1,108  52.2%  3,823  49.6%  3,602 
Other  20%  17.0%  147  24.7%  174  57.6%  1,185  58.8%  1,221 
Note: This table corresponds to Table 3. 
 
Table B.4: New Jersey Coverage Rates of Employment-Based Health Insurance and the Sample Size 
Sample  Wage 
Treatment Group Workers  Control Group Workers 
Before  After  Before  After 
Rates  #Obs  Rates  #Obs  Rates  #Obs  Rates  #Obs 
Everyone  10%  19.9%  1,161  18.8%  1,034  64.7%  22,753  63.7%  21,147 
Age<40  10%  17.1%  761  15.5%  701  61.9%  12,279  59.5%  10,980 
Fsize25  10%  11.9%  503  15.8%  419  38.4%  5,793  38.7%  5,499 
Fsize25 &age  10%  9.8%  315  12.1%  281  38.2%  3,039  37.8%  2,874 
White  10%  18.9%  774  19.6%  672  66.1%  17,175  65.6%  15,636 
Black  10%  29.2%  130  19.3%  119  64.9%  2,639  63.1%  2,477 
Hispanic  10%  18.0%  206  12.8%  187  57.1%  2,227  51.9%  2,190 
Other  10%  19.6%  51  26.8%  56  53.7%  712  59.0%  844 
Everyone  20%  27.5%  2,540  25.4%  2,405  66.7%  21,374  66.0%  19,776 
Age<40  20%  24.5%  1,674  22.5%  1,585  64.4%  11,366  62.2%  10,096 
Fsize25  20%  18.6%  980  15.6%  884  39.6%  5,316  40.9%  5,034 
Fsize25&age  20%  15.8%  626  13.1%  581  40.0%  2,728  40.6%  2,574 
White  20%  27.6%  1,679  28.1%  1,536  67.8%  16,270  67.5%  14,772 
Black  20%  35.4%  316  23.1%  316  66.9%  2,453  66.3%  2,280 
Hispanic  20%  22.1%  439  17.7%  436  60.7%  1,994  55.8%  1,941 
Other  20%  23.6%  106  26.5%  117  55.9%  657  61.6%  783 







Table B.5: Connecticut Coverage Rates of Employment-Based Health Insurance and the Sample Size 
Sample  Wage 
Treatment Group Workers  Control Group Workers 
Before  After  Before  After 
Rates  #Obs  Rates  #Obs  Rates  #Obs  Rates  #Obs 
Everyone  10%  20.2%  806  21.7%  1,259  59.8%  12,873  59.5%  19,425 
Age<40  10%  16.9%  526  17.0%  811  55.2%  6,371  54.0%  8,555 
Fsize25  10%  13.9%  346  12.9%  533  35.5%  3,483  36.3%  5,512 
Fsize25 &age  10%  13.3%  226  9.5%  328  33.9%  1,703  31.9%  2,338 
White  10%  21.7%  405  22.7%  652  63.4%  8,742  61.8%  13,421 
Black  10%  25.2%  115  24.3%  202  58.4%  1,473  60.4%  2,260 
Hispanic  10%  13.9%  245  17.8%  315  48.1%  2,115  47.0%  2,513 
Other  10%  29.3%  41  22.2%  90  52.1%  543  57.4%  1,231 
Everyone  20%  24.5%  1,712  27.6%  2,602  62.2%  11,967  61.4%  18,082 
Age<40  20%  21.7%  1,080  23.6%  1,587  58.0%  5,817  56.3%  7,779 
Fsize25  20%  14.0%  666  15.7%  1,036  37.7%  3,163  38.0%  5,009 
Fsize25&age  20%  14.1%  418  12.7%  598  36.3%  1,511  33.8%  2,068 
White  20%  27.4%  860  28.5%  1,346  65.1%  8,287  63.3%  12,727 
Black  20%  28.0%  250  31.4%  398  61.2%  1,338  62.4%  2,064 
Hispanic  20%  18.4%  522  24.0%  653  52.0%  1,838  49.7%  2,175 
Other  20%  22.5%  80  25.9%  205  55.0%  504  60.3%  1,116 
Note: This table corresponds to Table 5. 
 
 
Table B.6: Massachusetts Coverage Rates of Employment-Based Health Insurance and the Sample Size 
Sample  Wage 
Treatment Group Workers  Control Group Workers 
Before  After  Before  After 
Rates  #Obs  Rates  #Obs  Rates  #Obs  Rates  #Obs 
Everyone  10%  21.6%  819  22.1%  1,373  58.4%  13,099  58.1%  20,656 
Age<40  10%  17.9%  541  16.2%  879  53.8%  6,514  52.7%  9,152 
Fsize25  10%  15.5%  329  16.3%  609  35.3%  3,695  35.7%  6,166 
Fsize25 &age  10%  13.4%  209  11.6%  372  33.4%  1,786  31.8%  2,629 
White  10%  24.0%  483  23.7%  869  61.3%  9,945  59.8%  16,168 
Black  10%  22.7%  97  21.7%  152  56.1%  1,068  58.0%  1,597 
Hispanic  10%  13.9%  201  17.5%  257  44.8%  1,594  46.4%  1,864 
Other  10%  28.9%  38  21.1%  95  49.2%  492  53.2%  1,027 
Everyone  20%  25.8%  1,783  26.8%  2,771  60.7%  12,135  60.1%  19,258 
Age<40  20%  22.9%  1,152  21.2%  1,671  56.5%  5,903  55.2%  8,360 
Fsize25  20%  15.5%  656  17.1%  1,121  37.3%  3,368  37.2%  5,654 
Fsize25&age  20%  15.2%  414  12.6%  641  35.5%  1,581  33.8%  2,360 
White  20%  28.6%  1,082  28.5%  1,763  63.1%  9,346  61.4%  15,274 
Black  20%  27.7%  202  27.3%  300  58.7%  963  60.5%  1,449 
Hispanic  20%  18.2%  422  22.3%  512  48.4%  1,373  49.4%  1,609 
Other  20%  23.4%  77  22.4%  196  51.9%  453  56.4%  926 
Note: This table corresponds to Table 6. 
 
 